Monitoring for disease requires subsets of the host population to be sampled and tested for the pathogen. If all the samples return healthy, what are the chances the disease was present but missed? In this paper, we developed a statistical approach to solve this problem considering the fundamental property of infectious diseases: their growing incidence in the host population. The model gives an estimate of the incidence probability density as a function of the sampling effort, and can be reversed to derive adequate monitoring patterns ensuring a given maximum incidence in the population. We then present an approximation of this model, providing a simple rule of thumb for practitioners. The approximation is shown to be accurate for a sample size larger than 20, and we demonstrate its use by applying it to three plant pathogens: citrus canker, bacterial blight and grey mould.
Introduction 1
When it comes to disease management, surveillance programs have two different objec-2 tives: establishing disease absence in host populations, or ensuring an early detection 3 of any disease outbreak (Parnell et al., 2017) . Early detection is essential to disease 4 control mitigation, timely reactions generally being more successful and less detrimental 5 for the host population (Cunniffe et al., 2016) . For example, Carpenter et al. (2011) 6 showed for foot-and-mouth disease, that when delaying the detection from 7 to 22 days 7 after the initial infection, the containment measures required the culling 30 times more 8 host animals. Likewise, surveillance programs are operated to establish the absence or 9 presence of emerging strains of endemic pathogens, hence enabling trade certifications for 10 instance. Examples of these are emerging strains of plant pathogens that are insensitive 11 to the fungicides applied to control them, or strains that are virulent 1 in a crop cultivar 12 by having resistance breaking genes. 13 1 We use here the plant pathology definition where virulence signifies the ability of the pathogen to infect the host. In human and other animal pathology virulence is used as a measure of damage the pathogen does to the host.
Monitoring a disease requires the assessment of the pathological status of sampling 14 units. Assessments generally occur at the level of the host individual (e.g. for ash 15 dieback, Woodward & Boa, 2013) , but sometimes for convenience the sampling unit is a 16 subpopulation like a farm (e.g. for foot-and-mouth disease, Keeling et al., 2001) , or a 17 field (e.g. for bacterial blight in rice, Koyshibayev & Muminjanov, 2016) . In any case, 18 when the samples all return negative, it is still very important to account for the chance 19 that the pathogen was present but undetected (Cannon, 2002) . Therefore, declaring 20 disease absence is then a probabilistic evaluation, more samples making it less likely the 21 pathogen was missed. 22 The incidence 2 of a pathogen, noted q hereafter, is the proportion of the host 23 population infected. Estimating the incidence from a sample where all assessments 24 return negative for the pathogen can be defined as a zero-numerator problem, i.e. 25 estimating the probability of an event from data in which it has not occurred yet (Hanley 26 & Lippman-Hand, 1983; Winkler et al., 2002) . We thus want to calculate the probability 27 density, p(q|notf ound), of the incidence q given that none of the sampling units is 28 assessed as infected. This can be done by deriving p(notf ound|q) from the exponential 29 distribution, and then reversing it according to Bayes' rule, assuming a uniform prior 30 p(q). A practically useful quantity is the incidence q X for which
thus giving the upper bound of the X% confidence interval of q. This upper limit gives 32 the highest, still likely, incidence given a sampling effort. The rule of three is a very 33 common rule of thumb to estimate the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval (Louis, 34 1981) . For example, considering we have a random sample of size N , all returning 35 negative, the upper limit can be approximated by q 95 = 3 N +1 (Hanley & Lippman-Hand, 36 1983). This very practical rule of thumb can be used to identify a sampling effort N 37 that can ensure that infection is below a threshold value.
38
To ensure pathogen absence from an area over an extended time interval, the host 39 population have to be sampled repeatedly. Incidence estimation should then account 40 for the change of incidence between the rounds caused by the epidemic dynamics. In 41 this regard, Metz et al. (1983) accounted for the time dependence of samples due to 42 the epidemic dynamics when they assessed the level of epidemic risk associated with 43 a given sampling effort. However, when it comes to the incidence estimation problem, 44 the epidemic temporal dynamics is neglected while the focus is more likely set on the 45 spatial dependences of the samples due to the epidemic spread (Cameron & Baldock, 46 1998; Cannon, 2002; Coulston et al., 2008) .
47
Accounting for the epidemic dynamics, we address the incidence estimation problem 48 in the case of disease absence sampling (as Parnell et al., 2012, did with first discovery). 49 We present a model estimating the pathogen incidence in a population, being given a 50 sampling effort and an epidemic growth rate. We then derive an approximation of this 51 model (in the way of Alonso Chavez et al., 2016) providing a practical and simple way to 52 derive information from a negative sampling. This epidemically informed approximation 53 proves itself accurate and flexible enough to account for the asymptomatic period of 54 the disease. Finally, we apply this model to three case examples: citrus canker in an 55 orange orchard, the invasion of virulent pathogen strains of bacterial blight of rice and 56 the invasion of fungicide resistant pathogen strains in grey mould of grape. 57 2 We use here the plant pathology definition where incidence is the fraction of host units infected. In human and other animal pathology this is termed prevalence.
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Materials and methods 58 A monitoring program typically consists of batches of N samples randomly or regularly 59 distributed in space, and regularly iterated over K monitoring rounds with time intervals 60 of ∆ time units. Parnell et al. (2012) has shown how to use this particular structure 61 to derive the pathogen incidence when first detection occurs. In this section we use a 62 similar method to estimate the incidence when no infected sample has returned. 63 One monitoring round 64 Considering an incidence q in a population, the probability for a sample to return 65 negative is given by p(notf ound|q) = 1 − q. A sample of size N will therefore return 66 entirely negative with probability:
(2) Now, given a monitoring round returned negative, what does it tell us about q ? We can 68 derive p(q|notf ound), the incidence given no detection, from p(notf ound|q) using the 69 Bayes' theorem. Bayes' theorem relates those probabilities by:
(3)
The value p(q) is the prior probability density of q. Assuming no information on q, we 71 set p(q) to be a uniform and uninformative prior. Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 3 then 72 gives
As mentioned in the introduction, of particular interest is the upper limit of the X% 74 confidence interval given by Eq. 1 which, for the exponential distribution given by Eq. 75 4, gives 76 q X = −ln(1 − X/100) N + 1 .
Put in words, if we set a maximum incidence q X below which we are satisfied to consider 77 the host population to be free of disease, we can derive a sampling effort N , that will 78 ensure X% of the undetected diseases to have incidences smaller than q X .
79
Two monitoring rounds 80 Having two monitoring rounds can be seen as increasing the size of the sample:
where N 2 is the size of the current monitoring round and N 1 is the size of the previous 82 one. In this equation, the sizes of the historic and recent monitoring rounds are powers 83 of the same probability of negative sampling: 1 − q. However, as mentioned in the 84 introduction, the incidence of an infectious pathogen increases through time. Therefore, 85 non-detection in the last monitoring round occurred over a larger incidence than the 86 previous one.
87
As we are focused on absence sampling, we are interested in epidemics with low 88 incidences, so q 1. It is well established that at low incidence epidemics grow 89 exponentially (van der Plank, 1963; Faria et al., 2014; Bartlett et al., 2016) . We thus 90 assume q(t) = q(0)e rt where t is the time and r is the epidemic growth rate. In the time 91 3/17 interval ∆ between two monitoring rounds the pathogen incidence has grown by a factor 92 λ = e r∆ , or another words, the incidence in monitoring round i was a factor λ −1 smaller 93 than the incidence in monitoring round i + 1.
94
For our two-round case we thus have
K monitoring rounds 96 Building on this epidemic model, we can now generalise Eq. 7 to K monitoring rounds: 97
We can use the Bayes' theorem to compute the probability density of the incidence given 98 non-detection after K monitoring rounds as:
An approximation 100
Computing the probability density given by Eq. 9, as well as the subsequent upper limit 101 q X , requires integrations which need to be approximated numerically. It is computa-102 tionally inexpensive but still requires a computer program to be used. Here we develop 103 an approximation which makes the computation of p(q|notf ound) simple enough to be 104 useful for practitioners. It gives a rule of thumb in planning a monitoring program for a 105 given disease.
106
The approximation is built on the following two assumptions: (1) the sampling size 107 N is large enough (N > 10), and (2) the incidence q is small. Both assumption are 108 realistic as 10 is a relatively small sampling size, and as we are interested only in cases 109 with very low incidence. Using our assumption that q 1, we can approximate (1 − q) N 110 by e −qN . Substituting this in Eq.
(3) results in:
And following our assumption that N > 10, this equation can be approximated by
Similarly, for two monitoring rounds we find
and 115 4/17
If now we generalise to K monitoring rounds, it results in
where A is given by:
Before going further using the approximation, its accuracy needs to be evaluated. 118 First, the approximated and the exact probability densities p(q|notf ound) are compared 119 visually. And then, we investigate more carefully the difference between their respective 120 confidence intervals q X andq X . The comparison is likely to depend on the sampling 121 effort as well as on the epidemic growth rate, therefore the accuracy is evaluated for 122 wide ranges of the relevant parameters. The severity of these underestimations increases with the epidemic growth rate and 131 the time interval between rounds. As expected, the upper bound q X of the confidence 132 interval for q decreases with increasing sample size N and increasing number of sampling 133 rounds K. The faster the epidemic grows, the larger λ, and the larger q X , which is 134 also to be expected. What is less obvious but interesting to note is that if we compare 135 monitoring programs with the same sampling effort N · K (lower left versus upper right 136 panels in Figure 1 ), we see that q X is lower for monitoring programs that are shorter 137 in time (smaller K). This finding is consistent for other parameter values. However in 138 reality we do require a monitoring program to extend over long period of time to ensure 139 pathogen absence for the entire period.
140
The impact of λ on the incidence can be decomposed to investigate the impact of 141 the growth rate r and the time interval between rounds ∆. Since they are defined by 142 λ = e r∆ , they have the same impact on disease incidence, which is illustrated by the 143 diagonal symmetry in Figure 2 . This picture focus only on q X instead of the whole 144 probability density. Figure 2 also delineates a plateau for large values of λ, above which 145 a faster epidemic growth, or a larger monitoring time interval, does not significantly 146 increase the incidence of the undetected pathogen. This is also visible in Figure 1 where 147 the probability densities for λ = 10 and λ = 100 are very similar, despite the order of 148 magnitude change in λ. Finally, Figure 2 illustrates the greater impact of the sample 149 size N than the number of rounds K on the epidemic risk. Figure 1 . Probability density of the incidence given by Eq. 9 depending on the sampling effort (size N and repetition K) and on λ = e r∆ , the factor by witch the epidemic grows between two sampling rounds. The dashed lines are the upper bounds q X the 95% confidence interval.
Accuracy of the approximation 151
In developing an approximation, our aims are twofold: (1) provide an equation featuring 152 the model behaviours described in the previous subsection, and (2) provide an equation 153 simple enough that it can be solved "on the back of an envelop" when designing a 154 monitoring program. Figure 3 compares, for the case with two monitoring rounds 155 (K = 2), the exact and approximated probability densities (respectively given by Eqs. 9 156 and 15). We see that the exact and approximated density curves are barely distinguishable 157 whatever the sampling size and epidemic speed. However, if we take a closer look at our 158 index of interest q X , we see that low values of N cause significant inaccuracy (figured 159 by the shaded areas). This illustrates why the approximation does not hold for N < 10. 160 Figure 3 also shows a tendency towards inaccuracy when the epidemic growth or the 161 monitoring intervals increase.
162
The effect of K (the number of sampling rounds) is better visualised if we focus on 163 the relative error between the approximated and exact upper bounds |q X −q X | q X . Figure 4 164 confirms the trends previously observed: the accuracy increases with the sampling size 165 and decreases with the epidemic growth rate and time interval between samples. We see 166 that past N ≈ 20, good levels of accuracy of the approximation is achieved, even for 167 large epidemic growth rates. It also seems that going from K = 20 to K = 100 does not 168 improve the accuracy and we reach a plateau. which is also illustrated by the shaded areas in Figure 3 .
171
Applications 172
Having established that our approximation is accurate for sampling sizes N > 20, we 173 turn towards three applications of the model. However before this is possible we need to 174 discuss the asymptomatic period characteristic for most pathogens.
175
Accounting for an asymptomatic period 176 After infection, the host is not detectable for a duration of time that depends on the 177 pathogen species. This asymptomatic period is longer for visual assessment than for 178 molecular diagnostics, but exists for each assessment method. It corresponds to the 179 time needed by the host to develop detectable symptoms, i.e. outreaching a detection 180 threshold. Since we need to estimate the possible incidence of all infected hosts, and not 181 only of hosts with detectable infection, we need to take this asymptomatic period into 182 account.
183
During the asymptomatic period, the newly infected hosts, that are not yet detectable 184 as such, can still spread the pathogen. Therefore their impact on epidemics can be 185 considerable, especially in the early stage of the disease as illustrated by Figure 5 what we can observe, i.e. the detectable incidence q, and what is actually spreading the 188 pathogen, i.e. the total incidence q T , promptly becomes significant even for fairly short 189 asymptomatic periods.
190
Following the exponential model, the relation between the total incidence q T and the 191 detectable incidence q is given by:
with σ the duration of the asymptomatic period. Unlike the exact solution, the approxi-193 mation smoothly integrates this new epidemic trait. Eq. (15) and (16) become:
Application to three pathosystems Table 1 .
201
Our second example, bacterial blight of rice (caused by Xanthomonas oryzae pv. 202 oryzae), is a serious threat to food security across the globe (Reddy, 1989 ; Dewa 203 et al., 2011). Breeders have introduced resistance genes into rice cultivars making them 204 absolutely resistant to bacterial blight. However the bacterial species can overcome the 205 resistance and evolve virulent strains. Monitoring programs to establish the absence of 206 virulent strains and/or for early detection of emerging virulence are under development. 207 Observations are done at the field level (rather than at the host level), usually from the 208 roadside. Therefore the relevant r value to use in the monitoring model is the landscape 209 scale growth rate (infection from field to field, noted r L ), rather than the within field 210 one (infection from host to host, noted r F ). The parameters values for virulent strains 211 and an explanation of σ for this case are given in Table 1 and its subscript.
212
Our third example concerns grey mould (caused by Botrytis cinerea) a fungal plant 213 pathogen of grape (and countless many other hosts). The disease is controlled by 214 fungicide applications but the pathogen can evolve strains less sensitive or insensitive 215 to the fungicide. We consider here the case of insensitivity to Boscalid (a succinate 216 dehydrogenase inhibitor) to which resistance developed in Europe, Australia, the US 217 and South America. Monitoring consists of visits to a large number of grape fields and 218 sampling infections from host individual. Parameter ranges from literature are reported 219 in Table 1 . Time since first infection (in days) Incidence Figure 5 . Effect of the asymptomatic period on the incidence. Here this period (σ = 5 days) makes a great difference between the detectable incidence q and the total incidence q T .
Although apparently very different in monitoring scale, the case study pathogens 221 can be reported on the same parameter space. Figure 6 locates the epidemics according 222 to their estimated parameters r and σ. The black crosses figure for each pathogen the 223 likely parameter values, as well as their uncertainty (i.e. a long segment shows high 224 variability of the parameter in our sources). If we want to ensure (with 95% confidence) 225 a maximum incidence of 5%, the dashed black contour guides the selection of adequate 226 monitoring effort. Following this curve, we see that this maximum risk can be ensured 227 for the bacterial blight (BB) with only N = 20 fields sampled every ∆ = 180 days. The 228 grey mould (GM) case needs a little more frequent monitoring rounds and/or hosts 229 sampled. On the other hand, citrus canker will require N = 100 trees to be sampled 230 every ∆ = 30 days, a significantly larger effort.
231
An interesting output of Figure 6 is the impact of parameter uncertainty on the 232 predicted incidence q 95 . For example, although the uncertainty in the σ parameter of 233 bacterial blight (BB) is substantial, it is of least concern because it is tangent to the 234 incidence slope (i.e. parallel to the contours). However, such level of uncertainty in 235 the σ of citrus canker would have cause the "CC black cross" to intersect with all the 236 contour lines, hence predicting a very wide and uninformative range of incidence q 95 . In 237 this way, we can quickly assess how input uncertainty will affect the model output, and 238 where more meticulous parameter estimations are required.
239
These three examples show that, with a combination of crude parameter estimations 240 and a simple calculation, its is possible to assess the monitoring frequency, ∆, and the 241 number of hosts to assess per round, N , that are necessary to establish the absence of a 242 pathogen. ln q d qm , the time lag between strain emergence at individual scale from mutation (at incidence qm), with r F the within field growth rate.
Data from Adhikari et al. (1994 Adhikari et al. ( , 1999 .
Discussion

244
The main course of action for infectious disease management resides in monitoring and 245 appropriate response to its outcome. An efficient disease management limits the wasteful 246 use of pesticides, hence reducing their environmental and health consequences while 247 securing their long-term efficiencies. Well-timed responses can also limit the unnecessary 248 culling of hosts (Carpenter et al., 2011; Cunniffe et al., 2015) . In addition, monitoring 249 also benefits industries by enabling the certification of pathogen absence which is a 250 primary requirement in the trade of plant and animal produce.
251
Whether a species is absent or merely undetected is a recurrent question in ecology 252 (Mackenzie, 2005; Wintle et al., 2012) . When it comes to pathogens, absence sampling 253 has been addressed according to epidemics specificities, notably with careful attention 254 to the spatial structure of the host populations (Cameron & Baldock, 1998; Coulston 255 et al., 2008) . As Metz et al. (1983) did when evaluating the epidemic risk associated 256 with sampling efforts, we account for the epidemic progress between monitoring rounds 257 in our incidence estimation model. Such consideration is essential as we have shown here 258 that assuming a constant incidence over the whole monitoring period leads to severe 259 underestimations of the epidemic progress.
260
That an epidemiologically informed monitoring proves itself superior to a purely 261 statistical tool like the rule of three is no surprise. Simulation-based approaches are often 262 thoroughly fed with epidemiological knowledge and, so being, have been able to shed 263 light on various aspects of specific diseases like e.g. optimal culling ranges (Bates et al., 264 2003a,b) or economic impacts (Carpenter et al., 2011) for the foot-and-mouth disease. 265 However, such highly specific solutions are not readily valuable for distinct problems. 266 Practical use requires generic tools that are easily accessible and can be straightforwardly 267 applied to observations. Here we propose such a tool in the form of a simple formula, 268 11/17 our approximation, which relates a sampling effort to two critical epidemic traits in the 269 form of parameters, namely the growth rate and the asymptomatic period. A subsequent 270 interesting property of our model is that the derived sampling effort can be decomposed 271 in terms of N , K and ∆, and hence achieved with diverse programs.
272
It is worth keeping in mind that epidemiologically informed approaches are constrained 273 by the accuracy of the epidemic parameter estimates (Hyatt-Twynam et al., 2017). If 274 our objective is to predict the outcome of an ongoing disease outbreak, parameter 275 estimation must closely follow the detection events, which is often impractical (see 276 e.g. Neri et al., 2014) . On the other hand, when sampling for disease absence, no 277 observation of the ongoing epidemic exists yet. Parameter estimation is therefore taken 278 from previous occurrences of the epidemic, and possibly from different areas with different 279 environments, or even different hosts species. Occasionally, parameter estimation might 280 also be attempted from outbreaks of a similar disease. Obviously, the cost of widening 281 the origins of observations is an increasing uncertainty on the model outputs. It is then 282 imperative to assess whether or not very crude parameter estimates are acceptable. This 283 can be done conveniently with representations like Figure 6 . 284 
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Our estimation model relies on the strong hypothesis of the uniformity of p(q): all 285 incidences are equally likely to be found in the population. More precisely, in our case, 286 the uniformity of p(q) is ensured at the time of estimation, i.e. at the last sampling 287 round. A more common approach consists in ensuring p(q) uniformity at the first 288 sampling round, calculating a posterior distribution using Bayes' rule and then using 289 that posterior as prior for the second sample, etc. However, this would not lead to a 290 simple explicit equation like the one we provide, hence limiting its practical use. In 291 both cases, the uniformity of p(q) seems a bold assumption, as we know that low level 292 incidences are more commonly encountered during monitoring. Nonetheless, assuming 293 uniform p(q) is a conservative choice, as it biases the estimation towards the safest side: 294 the overestimation of the disease progress.
295
The model we present here is informed by the temporal dynamics of epidemics. 296 Whether it remains accurate when space becomes part of the system is not obvious, 297 and at some point is likely to depend on host spatial distribution. For example if hosts 298 are clustered in fields, the pathogen dispersion scale and the distance between fields 299 will determine whether or not an epidemic complies with the logistic model underlying 300 this study. Consequently, a direct comparison of our analytical results to spatially 301 explicit simulations should be conducted. In such numerical experiments not only the 302 epidemic but also the sampling process becomes spatially structured, hence breaking the 303 assumption of independent sampling. The robustness of our model in these conditions 304 would therefore be a solid confirmation of its practical value.
305
Conclusion 306 Non-detection is a possible outcome of monitoring programs, but it is an informative 307 one and it can be rendered into a robust risk assessment. Our approximation provides a 308 simple but reliable estimation of pathogen incidence given a sampling effort. It can also 309 be used to derive an appropriate monitoring program for a pathogen, providing that 310 epidemic traits are coarsely known. As it directly builds on elementary parameters of 311 monitoring and epidemic models, this tool can be intuitively adapted to diverse situations 312 as shown by our three examples. 
